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ABSTRACT 
 
W.E.L. Begley: On the Reception of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations in the Region of Liège from 
the 9th to the 11th Centuries 
(Under the direction of Robert G. Babcock) 
 
The study of reception of classical works often neglects material evidence, such as 
features of the physical manuscripts of the works. In the case of Cicero’s philosophical work the 
Tusculan Disputations, an 11th-century manuscript from the abbey of St. Peter in Gembloux 
(Brussels MS 5348-52) contains among its marginalia an extensive system of critical signs. An 
examination both of these critical signs and of quotations from other authors of the region and 
period reveals that the Tusculans were read and understood from the 9th to the 11th century in part 
as a source of quotations and anecdotes on topics ranging from the nature of the soul to the 
customs of the Spartans to biographical details of the Greek philosophers. 
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Material Evidence in the Study of Reception 
 Studies of the reception of a classical work in the Middle Ages have traditionally focused 
mostly on the work’s extant manuscripts, its presence in medieval booklists, and its quotation by 
medieval authors. This evidence can yield a picture—albeit an oft-incomplete one—of whether a 
particular work was being read; when the work was read; and where it was read. That picture is 
much fuzzier, however, when it comes to how the work was read, the interests, foci, and 
predilections of the audience of a given work. These questions have begun to be explored 
relatively recently using material evidence, namely, the physical manuscripts themselves. This 
thesis represents an exercise in a new way of studying reception, a way that takes into account 
the material evidence as an indicator of how the work was read. 
A particularly helpful kind of clue in a medieval manuscript is the presence of marginal 
annotations. When readers mark a passage at all, they show their interest in it, and the more 
complex a system of annotation they use, the clearer the evidence about their reasons for reading 
the text and their particular concerns. One extensively annotated manuscript is Brussels MS 
5348-52, an 11th-century manuscript of Cicero’s philosophical dialogue the Tusculan 
Disputations. Using the material evidence of the dense system of marginal notations in this 
manuscript, this thesis will explore the reception of the Tusculans in the 11th and 12th centuries, 
with a special focus on how readers of MS 5348-52, then at the monastery of St. Peter at 
Gembloux, in the diocese of Liège, understood the text.  
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The Tusculan Disputations in the Middle Ages 
C. Stephen Jaeger describes the Tusculan Disputations as “a rule of life, a philosophy that 
lent dignity to administrative service.”1 His support for this comes almost exclusively from the 
use of the Tusculans in the Regensburger Rhetorischen Briefe (hereafter, RRB), an epistolary 
collection from the 11th century that discusses the difficulties of clerical administration. The RRB 
quotes the Tusculans so extensively “that the letters occasionally appear a cento of passages from 
that work,”2 and the Tusculans become the bene vivendi disciplina, the “rule for living well,” and 
represent philosophy as the “teacher of manners and discipline.”3 Jaeger’s conclusion from 
Cicero’s heavy influence on the Regensburg letters is that the Tusculans represent “a work of 
major importance for the cathedral schools of the eleventh century.”4 Jaeger’s evidence for this, 
however, comes only from the work of a single author in a single location. In fact, Günther 
Glauche’s extensive study of school texts of the period before 1200 includes numerous works by 
Cicero,5 but the Tusculan Disputations are not mentioned a single time. The bulk of the reading 
and transmission of the Tusculans seems to have taken place later than Jaeger suggests, and in an 
entirely different location: “Though known in Bamberg, the Tusculans primarily circulated 
through the Loire houses. The role of this area in the dissemination of the text can be clearly seen 
in the library catalogues and surviving manuscripts of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, by 
                                                
1 Jaeger 84. 
 
2 Jaeger 84.  
 
3 Jaeger 121.  
 
4 Jaeger 84. 
 
5 Most often De senectute and De amicitia; e.g. Glauche 102, 123. 
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which time the Tusculan Disputations were well established and assured of survival.”6 
Furthermore, the Tusculans seem not to have been read, as Jaeger argues, simply as a guide to 
the active life. This thesis will address the gap between Jaeger’s assumptions about the 
importance of the Tusculans and the material evidence from the 11th and 12th centuries.  
The marginalia in the Gembloux Tusculans does not consist of scholia or commentary on 
the text, but rather a system of critical signs. First, I will examine this system of annotation by 
describing each of the seven kinds of critical signs that appear in the Gembloux Tusculans. I will 
describe the form and usage of each sign, drawing conclusions, where possible, about the 
meaning of the sign to the annotator(s). Next, I will give a brief synopsis of quotations of the 
Tusculans in the 11th and 12th centuries by writers connected to the Liège diocese and discuss 
whether there is any correlation between the interests of the Gembloux annotator and those of the 
authors who quote from the Tusculans.  
 
The Critical Signs in the Gembloux Tusculans  
 One of the most helpful and most overlooked tools one has in the study of the reception 
of a work is the marginalia in the work’s extant manuscripts. By examining the annotations made 
in the margins, one can see the foci, interests, and predilections of the work’s readers, helping 
answer why and how the work was read in a given period.7 The Gembloux manuscript of the 
Tusculan Disputations is particularly fecund in this regard: annotators have introduced well over 
180 distinct signs in the margins of the work. Because this study is limited to the reception of the 
work in the 11th and 12th century, I have not included in my discussion the marginalia, mostly 
                                                
6 Reynolds 135.  
 
7 See, for example, Teresa Webber’s work on the marginal annotations of manuscripts in 
Salisbury (135-137), or Birger Munk Olsen’s L’étude des auteurs classiques. 
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names, that dates to the 16th century. The older marginalia, however, contains seven types of 
notations, five of them from the list of critical marks in Isidore’s Etymologiae. The following 
study will examine the usage of each of these signs and adduce the reading interests that it 
betrays.  
 
The Manuscript 
 The Tusculan Disputations are the third of four works in Brussels MS 5348-52, a 
manuscript produced at Gembloux in the 11th century. The manuscript also contains Cicero’s De 
Inventione, Grillius’ commentary on the Pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium, and 
Cicero’s Pro Archia. The first two of these were copied under Olbert, Abbot at Gembloux from 
1012-1048, but the Tusculans and the Pro Archia may date to the second half of the century.8 
The Tusculans extend from folio 80r to 113r.  
 Our evidence for the medieval transmission of the text begins in Carolingian Gaul, where 
an archetype that arrived in the latter part of the eighth century was promulgated among the 
scholars of the Carolingian court.9 Despite its popularity during the Carolingian Renaissance, 
however, it seems not to have been common in libraries before the 11th century. Lupus of 
Ferrières requests a copy of the Tusculan Disputations in a letter to Adelgaud (840/841 A.D.), 
but according to Reynolds, Lupus never quotes from the Tusculans, and may never have received 
                                                
8 Munk Olsen, C68.  
 
9 Reynolds 132-133. 
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the copy of them he had requested.10 Only by the late 11th century were the Tusculan 
Disputations “well established and assured of survival.”11 
 
The Marginal Annotations 
The Diple Periestigmene 
 A common sign in the margins of Brussels MS 5351 consists of a bent 
line, like a “greater than” sign, with a dot on either side of the upper half of the 
line (Figure 1). Isidore identifies the sign: diple periestigmene, id est cum geminis punctis. Hanc 
antiqui in his opponebant quae Zenodotus Ephesius non recte adiecerat, aut detraxerat, aut 
permutaverat. In his et nostri ea usi sunt (the diple periestigmene, i.e. ‘with two dots.’ The 
ancients put this sign opposite passages which Zenodotus of Ephesus12 had incorrectly inserted, 
removed or changed. Our scribes too use it in these cases; XXI.15).13 Like the antiqui, the 
annotators at Gembloux used the sign to mark textual problems or suspected textual problems. 
The note appears 33 times (once, on 108v, it appears within the actual body of the text between 
the lines of writing rather than in the margin. It is the only such appearance of any of the signs 
discussed in this paper).  Some of the textual difficulties marked by the diple are more severe 
than others, but in the majority of cases, the passage in question contains an easily identifiable 
textual problem.  
                                                
10 Reynolds 133. Lupus does in fact quote once from the Tusculans (Ep. 1, p. 2 in Marshall’s 
edition), but the passage comes more directly from Augustine’s De Civitate Dei.  
 
11 Reynolds 135. 
 
12 The first librarian at the Library of Alexandria and a textual critic of Homer.  
 
13 All translations are mine. 
Figure 1 
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 The marked textual problems most often involve the omission or transposition of a letter 
or two. For example, at 95r (Tusc. 3.26), in a poetic quotation, the manuscript reads lacrimae 
peredere humorem exsanguis genas situ nitoris. The text in the manuscripts has generally 
troubled editors. For the sake of the sense, humorem must be corrected from the accusative to the 
ablative humore. The manuscripts generally have situ nitoris, but the Loeb edition, following 
Lachmann, has situm inter oris.  
Similarly, on 107v, the manuscript reads nam quid profitetur odiibo perfecturam se qui 
legibus suis paruisset... The odi ibo (“I hate! I will go!”) is utterly nonsensical, and subsequent 
editions have emended it to o di boni, giving nam quid profitetur? o di boni! perfecturam se, qui 
legibus suis paruisset... (for what does it promise? Ye gods! That it will perfect the one who 
obeys its laws... ; Tusc. 5.19). A further example appears on 111r (Tusc. 5.88), where the text 
should read nec haec sic agit ut ex tempore quasi effutire videatur, but the manuscript has ait for 
agit (“says” rather than “does”).  
Beyond simple transposition and omission of letters, sometimes the diple periestigmene 
marks garbling and omission of entire words. At 93r, the text should read cum vero eodem quasi 
maxumus quidam magister populus accessit atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo 
(but when popular opinion is added to this [i.e., the influence of the poets] as if it were the 
greatest teacher and the whole mob joins together on all sides in faults... ; Tusc. 3.3). The 
manuscript is missing the verb accessit altogether, which injures the sense of the clause critically 
enough that it was recognized as problematic and was marked accordingly.  Similarly, the 
Gembloux annotator detected a problem at 94r (Tusc. 3.12), where the manuscript reads ...nec 
debet nec aegrotassem · Si inquit fuerat sensus adsit... The manuscript’s interpunct breaks the 
thought into two distinct sentences, both essentially meaningless. Later editors have concurred 
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with the annotator in doubting the accuracy of the text, and the Loeb follows Halm’s 
emendation, which moves the punctuation and alters two words: ...nec debet. Ne aegrotus sim; si 
sim, qui fuerat sensus adsit...(the second sentence, newly divided, reads “Let me not be sick; if I 
should be sick, let what sensation I had before remain...”). A similar passage that is generally 
emended for the sake of the sense comes at 102v where the manuscript has quae si quando ei 
demptaretur id quod ei fuerit concupitum... (Tusc. 4.35). Demptaretur is an otherwise unattested 
form in classical Latin, and the Loeb, following other manuscripts, has si quando adepta erit in 
place of si quando ei demptarentur (the revised text translates “if [the soul] acquires what it has 
longed for...”). In a similar circumstance, the sign marks a nonexistent word at 110v, where the 
manuscript reads inde est inadatio nata initiorum (Tusc. 5.69). Inadatio does not exist in Latin, 
and other manuscripts replace it with indagatio.   
 
The Phrontis 
 There are 23 appearances of a phi-rho ligature in the Gembloux Tusculans, with the circle 
of the phi partly down the shaft of the rho (Figure 2). Isidore is fairly concise about the sign: Phi 
et Ro, id est ‘frontis.’ Haec, ubi aliquid obscuritatis est, ob sollicitudinem ponitur (a phi 
and a rho, that is, a phrontis. This sign is placed where something is obscure in order to 
signal concern about the passage; XXI.23). There is evidently a great deal of solicitude 
on the part of the annotator, who uses this sign very often: among the notations in the 
Tusculans, it trails only the diple periestigmene and the dm/m abbreviation in frequency.  
 The usage appears to be related to that of the diple periestigmene in that it denotes 
difficult readings, but where the diple tends to mark passages with textual problems, the phrontis 
seems to mark passages that contain readings that are difficult for some reason besides the text. 
Figure 2 
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The primary meaning of the Greek φροντίς is “attention,” and the implication both of Isidore’s 
definition and the sign’s usage is that phrontis-marked passages, unlike diple-marked passages, 
can be understood, but they require more careful attention on the part of the reader. When the 
annotator came across a difficult passage, he seemed to feel the need to mark it; if he suspected 
the text was faulty, he generally used a diple periestigmene, and if he thought the text was 
correct but found it difficult to understand, he used the phrontis.   
 There are several causes of the difficulty and obscuritas that merit a phrontis. One cause 
is, in fact, flaws in the text, but these are generally so minor that the annotator seems not to have 
recognized them as textual problems—faulting his own understanding rather than the scribe’s 
accuracy, he used a phrontis rather than a diple periestigmene. At 101r, for instance, Cicero 
makes a fine distinction between the state of being drunk and the habit of drunkenness: inter 
ebrietatem et ebriositatem interest (Tusc. 4.27). The manuscript, however, lacks et ebriositatem, 
leaving a reader to cast about for the other term in the distinction. Since interesse has a number 
of meanings, the fact that Cicero is even making a distinction at all is obscured by the omission, 
and the annotator has marked the resulting confusion with a phrontis. Another problem of the 
same sort appears lower on the same page, where the text reads exquor nec timor eum nec angor 
attingat (Tusc. 5.17). Exquor is not a Latin word, but looks convincingly like one amidst the 
apparently parallel nouns timor and angor. Though the annotator recognized inadatio as an error 
(110v, see above), he was evidently less certain about exquor and elected to mark it with a 
phrontis rather than a diple periestigmene. Other manuscripts read ex quo (‘wherefore neither 
fear nor torment touch him’), followed in modern editions of the text. Comparable passages to 
those I have described abound in the manuscript. At 107v (Tusc. 5.18), the manuscript has sed 
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ante docuisset for se ante docuisse; at 108v (Tusc. 5.36), the manuscript has esse where the 
generally accepted ex se makes better sense.  
Sometimes, the text is correct but the manuscript’s punctuation (such as it is) obscures 
the meaning. Some of these passages too are marked by the phrontis. At Tusc. 3.36, for instance, 
Cicero imagines himself being encouraged by the ancient philosophers: 
 
...Pythagoras mihi si diceret aut Socrates aut Plato: 'Quid iaces aut quid maeres 
aut cur succumbis cedisque fortunae? quae pervellere te forsitan potuerit et 
pungere, non potuit certe vires frangere. Magna vis est in virtutibus; eas excita, si 
forte dormiunt. (Tusc. 3.36) 
 
...if Pythagoras or Socrates or Plato were to say to me “why are you lying down? 
Why are you sad? Why are you giving up and surrendering to your luck? Luck 
could perhaps have poked or prodded you, but surely it could not break your 
strength. There is a great power in your virtues; awake them, if they happen to be 
asleep.” 
 
In the manuscript, however, the passage contains the following punctuation and capitalization: 
quae pervellere te forsitan potuerit · & pungere non potuit · Certe vires frangere magna vis est · 
in virtutibus eas excita si forte dormiunt · (perhaps [luck] could have bothered you, and was not 
able to prick you. Surely to break your strength is a great violence: awake them [?] in virtues if 
they happen to be asleep). Grammatically, the manuscript reading is at least defensible, but the 
sense of the passage suffers from the punctuation. The annotator found here aliquid obscuritatis, 
and marked it with a phrontis.   
The phrontis also appears commonly beside the appearance of rare words. On 97v, for 
example, there is a passage full of recondite vocabulary: Conlocemus in culcita plumea, 
psaltriam adducamus, demus hedychrum, incendamus scutellam dulciculae potionis aliquid 
videamus et cibi? (let us put her in a featherbed, bring in a lute-player, give her face-cream, cook 
up a platter and see some food and something sweet to drink; Tusc. 3.46). The words culcita, 
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scutella, and hedychrum, which is spelled hedrycrum in the manuscript, are all 
found only here in Cicero. So too at 106r, where the sign accompanies a use of the 
word aeculeum (Tusc. 5.12), a relatively rare14 word for an instrument of torture, 
and at 92v (Tusc. 2.45), where Cicero alludes to the death of Epicurus by colic 
(tormina) and painful urination (stranguria, or stransguria in the manuscript). In both cases, 
since the phrontis, which is elsewhere enlarged to mark out as many as nine lines of text (Figure 
3), marks only the line in which the unusual word appears (Figure 4), the mark 
probably signifies that the obscurity stems from a single abstruse word.   
 The other most common source of confusion that leads to a use of the 
phrontis is difficulty with Greek. The sign appears at 101r, for instance, next to the following 
garbled Greek: Quale in misso gino atili est · ut in hominum universum genus quod accepimus de 
Timone · qui misανερωιτοσα appellantur... (Tusc. 4.25). Here, two different problems are in play. 
First, the scribe seems not to have recognized that the name of Atilius’ play was the Greek word 
Μισόγυνος, which resulted in the botched transliteration misso gino. Throughout the rest of the 
manuscript, Greek words are written in Greek characters and are 
overlined (Figure 5). Misso gino, however, is in Roman characters 
and has no line over it, indicating that the scribe failed to identify the word as Greek. The second 
source of confusion is the poor transliteration of µισάνθρωπος, the epithet applied to Timon of 
Athens. The manuscript has what seems to be a mix of Roman and Greek letters 
(misανερωιτοσα)—the line over the word does not begin until after the first two letters—and the 
                                                
14 Though not unprecedented: see Cicero Phil.11.7, De Finibus 4.31, and twice more in the 
Tusculans themselves (5.13 and 5.14). 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
Figure 5 
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Greek lettering is incorrect. Whether or not the annotator knew Greek, the passage would have 
vexed him.  
Even when transliterated correctly, Greek names and terms are often marked with a 
phrontis. A long passage at 95r is marked by a phrontis, in which several names from Greek 
myth appear: Tantalus, Oenomaus, Hippodamea (Tusc. 3.26). All the names are written in 
accurate Roman characters except that Hippodamea appears without the initial h (hardly 
uncommon). Toward the end of the marked passage, however, where the name Thyestes appears, 
the text is slightly corrupt: rather than Tu te, Thyesta, the manuscript reads Tu&hyesta. The 
missing t is probably not the only reason that the annotator has urged the reader to pay attention, 
since it appears at the very end of a lengthy passage; more likely, the quick succession of Greek 
names made the reading difficult. Another large specimen of the phrontis appears on 94r beside a 
lengthy passage that deals with distinctions between various Greek philosophical terms:  
at illud est latius; omnis enim abstinentia, omnis innocentia (quae apud Graecos 
usitatum nomen nullum habet, sed habere potest ἀβλάβειαν ; nam est innocentia 
adfectio talis animi quae noceat nemini)—reliquas etiam virtutes frugalitas 
continet. Quae nisi tanta esset, et si iis angustiis, quibus plerique putant teneretur, 
numquam esset L. Pisonis cognomen tanto opere laudatum. (Tusc. 3.16) 
 
But that [i.e., the Latin term frugi] is broader in meaning [than the Greek term 
χρησίµους], for it describes all self-restraint, all innocence (which has no 
everyday term among the Greeks, but can be called ‘harmlessness;’ for innocence 
is a state of mind of the kind that would not harm anyone)—frugality contains all 
the other virtues as well. If it were not so inclusive, and if it were checked by the 
restraints that most people think, Lucius Piso’s cognomen [Frugi] would never 
have been praised as greatly as it is.  
 
Cicero’s subtle comparisons between the philosophical vocabularies of Greek and Latin might 
indeed have required the extra attention for which the phrontis calls, or perhaps the Greek terms 
in the passage and the surrounding text caused confusion for the annotator.  
  12 
 In any case, the phrontis almost invariably denotes a passage that contains some difficulty 
for the reader—aliquid obscuritatis, in Isidore’s words. Unlike the diple periestigmene, the 
phrontis is not limited to textual problems, and the annotator may not have realized that some of 
the passages by which he wrote the phrontis were corrupt at all, so slight are the errors.  
 
The Chrisimon 
 Another sign described by Isidore found in the margins of the Gembloux Tusculans is a 
rho in ligature with a chi (Figure 6). The marginal note should not, however, be 
interpreted with the Christian connotations of its heraldic doppelgänger; the 
likeness in appearance is entirely coincidental. Isidore calls the note the 
chrisimon, and says haec sola ex voluntate uniuscuiusque ad aliquid notandum ponitur (this is 
set down to mark something according solely to the will of any one person; XXI.22). Isidore’s 
meaning is not entirely clear, but he seems to imply that the chrisimon is a marker of private 
interest to the annotator, as opposed to the anchora superior (see below), for instance, which 
marks matters of great importance to anyone.  
 Isidore’s vagueness is borne out by the chrisimon’s variety of uses in the Tusculans 
manuscript. The sign appears ten times, five of them in Book 4, and any pattern in its usage is 
obscure. It marks a few topics more than once, and on a pair of occasions it marks minor textual 
variations, but there is no clear unifying feature in chrisimon-marked passages in the manuscript.  
Twice, the chrisimon coincides with a passage that contains a minor textual variant. At 
93v (Tusc. 2.60), the manuscript reads  
ad philosophos me revocas, qui in aciem non saepe prodeunt. e quibus homo sane 
levis, Heracleotes Dionysius, cum a Zenone ne fortis esse didicisset, a dolore 
dedoctus est. Nam cum ex renibus laboraret, ipso in eiulatu clamitabat falsa esse 
illa quae antea de dolore ipse sensisset.  
Figure 6 
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You call me back to the philosophers who do not often go forth into battle. 
Though one of them, Dionysius of Heraclea, a rather inconstant fellow, had 
learned from Zeno not to be brave, he forgot his learning because of his pain. For 
when he was in distress from his kidneys, in the very midst of his groans he 
shouted that what he had previously thought about pain was wrong.  
 
The repeated ne is an instance of scribal dittography, and its presence reverses the meaning of 
the passage (i.e., Zeno presumably taught Dionysius to be brave, not cowardly). The chrisimon 
may, then, indicate to the annotator to return to a passage and verify his initial impulse that the 
text does not say what it ought to say.   
 Similarly, at 103v (Tusc. 4.49), the manuscript reads Ergo re Torquatum quidem illum, 
qui hoc cognomen invenit, iratum existimo Gallo torquem detraxisse (Therefore, in fact [?], I 
suppose that the famous Torquatus, who obtained this cognomen, was angry when he tore the 
chain away from the Gaul...). The re standing alone is irregular, and the passage as it stands does 
not support the speaker’s point in the context, since his argument is that soldiers need not be 
angry at their enemies to be effective in battle. Most other manuscripts read ego ne for ergo re. 
Again, the chrisimon may indicate in this case an annotator’s unease with the text of the passage. 
Since these two passages are the only chrisimon-marked instances of textual errors, however, the 
sign’s primary function cannot be to notate textual problems; furthermore, two other signs (the 
diple periestigmene and the phrontis, discussed above) already deal with difficult readings. The 
chrisimon may even have been written in error where the fairly similar phrontis sign was 
intended, but both of these passages, like those discussed below, are historical anecdotes.  
 The topics of the marked passages also vary. One such topic is the desirability of an early 
death: 
cum enim illam ad sollemne et statum sacrificium curru vehi ius esset satis longe 
ab oppido ad fanum morarenturque iumenta, tum iuvenes hi quos modo nominavi 
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veste posita corpora oleo perunxerunt, ad iugum accesserunt. ita sacerdos 
advecta in fanum, cum currus esset ductus a filiis, precata a dea dicitur... (88r; 
Tusc. 1.113) 
 
When she was obliged to be carried in a chariot to an annual religious festival at a 
shrine fairly far from the town, and her oxen were going slowly, these young men 
whom I just named removed their garments, oiled their bodies, and took up the 
yoke. In this way was the priestess conveyed to the shrine, and because her 
chariot had been drawn by her sons, she is said to have entreated the goddess to...  
 
This is the beginning of the story of Cleobis and Biton, the two pious sons who carry their 
mother to the temple and are rewarded with quod maxumum homini dari posset a deo (the 
greatest thing that can be given to a human by a god, Tusc. 1.113), namely a painless and 
immediate death. The note, however, marks out only the portion of the story quoted above, that 
is, the set-up rather than the punch line. The text is entirely legible, and no rare words appear, so 
it is difficult to see what the mark notates besides the topic.  
 Another marked passage comes during a discussion of how one’s motivation affects 
one’s ability to suffer pain. The passage illustrates with the example of wounded soldiers:  
Saepe enim multi qui aut propter victoriae cupiditatem aut propter gloriae aut 
etiam, ut ius suum et libertatem tenerent, vulnera exceperunt fortiter et tulerunt, 
iidem omissa contentione dolorem morbi ferre non possunt; neque enim illum 
quem facile tulerant ratione aut sapientia tulerant, sed studio potius et gloria. 
(93v; Tusc. 2.65) 
 
For often many people have been wounded, either on account of their desire for 
victory or for glory, or even so that they retain their rights and freedom, and have 
borne their wounds bravely, but these same people cannot bear the pain of 
sickness when no such strife exists. For indeed, that which they had borne easily 
they had borne not through reason or wisdom but rather through fervor and glory.  
 
Again, the only aspect of this passage that seems worth marking is the topic, and the annotator 
may have had a mild interest in some of the topics presented in the passage. The story of Cleobis 
and Biton, like the passage quoted here, comes up in the context of pain: the sons’ sudden death 
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is a way to avoid the pains of life, and comes up as part of a discussion about the dead’s 
insensibility to pain. Since the sign appears so infrequently, the chrisimon’s link to this topic, 
however, or any topic is difficult to defend—no clear topical pattern emerges from the chrisimon 
passages. 
 On two occasions, the sign marks a passage that contains an attack on an ancient 
philosophical school and its permissiveness toward vice. First, the Stoic interlocutor takes aim at 
the Epicureans: ‘At laudat saepe virtutem'. Et quidem C. Gracchus, cum largitiones maximas 
fecisset et effudisset aerarium verbis tamen defendebat aerarium. Quid verba audiam cum facta 
videam? (‘But [Epicurus] frequently praises virtue.’ To be sure, just so Gaius Gracchus defended 
the public treasury in his speeches even though he had dispensed huge bribes and squandered the 
treasury. Why should I heed words when I can see deeds? 97v; Tusc. 3.48). The insinuation of 
Epicurus’ hypocrisy marked here is mild compared to the philosophical shortcomings of the 
Peripatetics on the matter of vice, however: Quam ob rem nihil interest, utrum moderatas 
perturbationes adprobent an moderatam iniustitiam, moderatam ignaviam, moderatam 
intemperantiam; qui enim vitiis modum apponit, is partem suscipit vitiorum (Therefore, it makes 
no difference whether they approve moderate passions or moderate injustice, moderate laziness, 
moderate immoderation; for he who accords a proper measure to vices supports a part in those 
vices. 102r; Tusc. 4.42). The interlocutor finds the Peripatetic emphasis on “moderation in all 
things” indefensible when it comes to vice. In these cases, the chrisimon seems to mark an 
interest in Stoic refutation of rival philosophical schools, especially on the topic of the 
permissibility of vice.   
 The passages marked by the chrisimon vary in form (e.g., an anecdote or a quotation) 
nearly as much as they do in topic, but there is a discernible pattern that unites many of the 
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chrisimon’s loci—the annotator shows a predilection for anecdotes. In three cases, the sign 
coincides with an anecdote from Greek history, philosophy, or mythology. The chrisimon on 88r 
marks the initial lines of the story of Cleobis and Biton, quoted above; the sign on 93v notates an 
anecdote about the Greek philosopher Dionysius of Heraclea and his recantation of stoicism, also 
quoted above; and at 95r, the sign appears beside a pithy story of a different Dionysius: 
Dionysius quidem tyrannus Syracusis expulsus Corinthi pueros docebat: usque eo imperio 
carere non poterat (the ruler Dionysius, for example, when he was driven out from Syracuse, 
used to teach schoolboys in Corinth because he could not do without having sovereignty; Tusc. 
3.27). On two other occasions, the sign marks short episodes from Roman history, both already 
quoted in this section: the hypocrisy of Gaius Gracchus at 97v, and the beginning of the story of 
Torquatus’ cognomen at 103v. Even the passage at 93v about soldiers’ ability to suffer pain in 
battle but not in sickness is a sort of anecdote, albeit one removed from the specificity of the 
historical and literary realm to the generality of the world at large. In these cases, the marked 
anecdotes illustrate points on a number of topics, most often discussions of virtue and vice, 
broadly speaking. The Tusculans’ profusion of dialogue about virtue and vice, however, makes it 
seem that the chrisimon marks these passages as much for their value as illustrative anecdotes as 
for the specific content that they illustrate. 
 The other use worth mentioning that deals with a type of illustration instead of with 
content is that of the distinction. Frequently in the Tusculans, Cicero must define the terms of the 
discussion by making fine distinctions between two easily confused words. At 95v, he 
distinguishes between invidia and invidentia:  
non dixi 'invidiam', quae tum est, cum invidetur; ab invidendo autem invidentia 
recte dici potest, ut effugiamus ambiguum nomen invidiae. Quod verbum ductum 
est a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius, ut est in Melanippo: 'Quisnam florem 
liberum invidit meum?' (Tusc. 3.20) 
  17 
 
I did not say invidia, which indicates when one is envied, but it can rightly be 
called invidentia, which comes from invidere, so we can avoid the ambiguous 
term invidia. This word is derived from the act of giving excessive attention to 
someone else’s fortune, as in Melanippus: ‘Who has looked down on my blossom 
of children?’ 
 
The sign extends down to the introduction of the quotation from Melanippus, but 
the main area marked out is the distinction itself, which might be of use to a 
medieval reader trying to understand the subtleties of the classical vocabulary, or 
one who enjoys an etymological excursus. A little later in the manuscript, the 
chrisimon reappears beside another distinction: nam cum omnis perturbatio miseria est, tum 
carnificina est aegritudo (for while any disquiet is a misery, anguish is a torture; Tusc. 3.27). 
Here, Cicero’s interlocutor illustrates the difference in degree between two related words about 
psychic distress, perturbatio and aegritudo, both of which are important and almost technical to 
the discourse of the Tusculans. The sign next to this passage is written along with the word 
carnificina (Figure 7). If the two pieces of marginalia are doing the same work, it is possible that 
a use of the chrisimon is to mark an unfamiliar word: a search for carnificina yields only 13 
results in classical literature, and only three of them from Cicero. On balance, however, the 
chrisimon seems more likely to denote the passages definition of philosophical terms than the 
rare vocabulary. 
 The sign, then, has no obvious and consistent usage, so I have presented what small 
patterns exist among the passages it marks. If indeed the Gembloux annotators have used the 
sign as Isidore described it—according solely to the will of the annotator—there need not be any 
consistency in its usage. The most likely explanations for the annotation are as follows: the 
chrisimon appears by passages that are interesting to the annotator but not in such a way that 
Figure 7 
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would make another sign appropriate (such as the dm or the y discussed below), or the chrisimon 
indicates a difference in degree of interest from related signs.  
 
Imperatives 
The least ambiguous of the annotations are the direct commands to the reader. 
At seven points in the text, six of them in Book 1, the annotations order the reader to 
pay greater attention, albeit varying degrees of greater attention. These marginal 
imperatives appear either written out one letter at a time from top to 
bottom (Figure 8) or, in three cases of the word nota, in ligature (Figure 
9). That the annotator uses four different words for “pay attention” 
(attende, intende, insiste, nota) indicates a desire to create a hierarchy among the 
marked passages. Nota (take note) is the weakest of the four words; attende and intende 
are nearly synonyms—intende may be slightly more emphatic—of a somewhat greater 
strength than nota; and the command for the most intensive (insistent?) attention is 
insiste. 
The nota ligature appears for the first time on 80r, marking a short passage 
about glory: honos alit artes, omnesque incenduntur ad studia gloria, iacentque ea 
semper, quae apud quosque improbantur (Esteem nourishes the arts, and all are kindled 
to their pursuits by the desire for glory, while things that are generally disapproved are always 
neglected; Tusc. 1.4). The passage is aphoristic in its concision, which may explain both the kind 
of mark and the form of the mark. The annotator may wish the reader to play closer attention to 
Cicero’s summary of the preceding discussion. The other two uses of the nota ligature seem to 
Figure 9 
Figure 8 
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arise from similar motives. At the end of a long argument filled with illustrative anecdotes about 
the necessity of burial and the treatment of the dead, Cicero quotes from Anaxagoras, who has 
been asked if he would like his body to be returned to his homeland: ‘nihil necesse est' inquit, 
'undique enim ad inferos tantundem viae est’ (‘No need for that,’ he said, ‘for the road to the 
underworld is the same length from everywhere;’ 87r, Tusc. 1.104). Again, the nota ligature 
accompanies a brief encapsulation of a longer section. The final nota ligature (and the only 
imperative after Book 1) comes on 89r, where Cicero summarizes his previous thoughts about 
the necessity for good style in philosophical writing: nobis autem videtur, quicquid litteris 
mandetur, id commendari omnium eruditorum lectioni decere (it seems to me, though, that 
whatever is entrusted to writing ought to be agreeable to the reading of all educated people; 2.8). 
Here too, the nota ligature appears opposite a pithy, memorable summary of a lengthier 
preceding passage.  
On one occasion (at 83r), the command nota is written out fully to mark out a much 
longer passage:  
sed ut non physici solum docent verum etiam medici, qui ista aperta et patefacta 
viderunt, viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad auris, ad naris a sede animi 
perforatae. Itaque saepe aut cogitatione aut aliqua vi morbi impediti apertis 
atque integris et oculis et auribus nec videmus, nec audimus, ut facile intellegi 
possit animum et videre et audire, non eas partis quae quasi fenestrae sint animi, 
quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat et adsit. Quid, quod eadem 
mente res dissimillimas comprendimus, ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, 
sonum? Quae numquam quinque nuntiis animus cognosceret, nisi ad eum omnia 
referrentur et is omnium iudex solus esset. atque ea profecto tum multo puriora et 
dilucidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, liber animus pervenerit. nam nunc 
quidem, quamquam foramina illa, quae patent ad animum a corpore, callidissimo 
artificio natura fabricata est, tamen terrenis concretisque corporibus sunt 
intersaepta quodam modo...  
(Tusc. 1.46-47) 
 
But as both our scientists and our doctors who have seen such things opened up 
and laid bare teach us, there are pathways of a sort pierced from the location of 
the soul to the eyes, the ears, and the nose. For this reason, therefore, though our 
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eyes and ears are open and sound, often we do not see or hear because we are 
hindered by deep thought or by some illness. It is easily understood, then, that the 
soul sees and hears, not those parts that are essentially windows to the soul. Even 
so, the mind can see nothing with them without being attentive and interested. 
What about the fact that we perceive such dissimilar things as color, taste, heat, 
smell, and sound all with the same mind? The soul would never receive the 
understanding of these things from its five messengers unless everything were 
referred to it and it were the only judge about everything. Furthermore, much 
purer and clearer things will be surely be sensed once the soul is liberated and 
comes to the place where nature brings it. For even now, although those channels 
that lead from the body to the soul were designed with the most skillful artistry by 
nature, they are still in a way enclosed by earthly, concrete matter... 
 
Here, rather than mark out a short summary, the nota designates a whole passage of interest, a 
passage about the soul as the agent of sensation in the body, which is kept connected to the ears, 
eyes, etc. by physical passages. Book 1’s extensive discussion of the soul and its characteristics 
is heavily marked (see especially the discussion of the y sign below), and the topic clearly 
fascinates the annotator.  
If the gradations of the different imperatives I have proposed are true, the annotator finds 
even more fascinating the passage on the facing page (83v), which he has marked with an 
intende so long that the inten- appears in the left margin and the –de in the central one. This 
passage (ad universi caeli complexum...cum e corpore excesserint; Tusc. 1.40) describes Cicero’s 
cosmology—that the earth is a κέντρον in the middle of the universe, created by the separation of 
the heavy elements (water and earth) from the light ones (air and fire)—and uses it to prove that 
souls, being composed of airy matter, must rise when they leave the body. Here, the intende 
identifies the whole passage as one of significant interest rather than just marking the closing 
summary.  
At 85v, the word attende runs down most of the left margin of the page, marking out ut 
cum videmus speciem...moderator tanti operis et muneris (Tusc. 1.68-70). The passage, like the 
one marked by the intende, describes the intricacy of the cosmos and earth’s place at the center. 
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Cicero goes further, mentioning mankind’s primacy in the world (hominemque ipsum quasi 
contemplatorem caeli ac deorum eorumque cultorem atque hominis utilitati agros omnes et 
maria parentia; [we see] Man himself, as though an observer and worshipper of heaven and the 
gods, and all the fields and seas obedient to Man’s use; Tusc. 1.69) and using the complexity of 
the world to argue for the existence of a divine creator:   
haec igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare quin iis 
praesit aliquis vel effector, si haec nata sunt, ut Platoni videtur, vel, si semper 
fuerunt, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris? (Tusc. 1.70) 
 
When we recognize these proofs, then, and countless others, can we doubt that 
presiding over them is either some author (if they came into being, as Plato 
thinks) or (if they have always existed, as Aristotle opines) some governor of so 
great a work and structure?  
 
Both of the passages I have quoted would be noteworthy to a Christian reader. Compare to 
Cicero’s view of Man’s place in the universe to God’s command to the first humans: replete 
terram et subicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et universis animantibus 
quae moventur super terram (fill the earth and subdue it, and rule over the fish of the sea and the 
flying things of the sky and all the living creatures that move on the ground; Vulg. Gen. 1.28). To 
a reader steeped in the Vulgate Bible, Cicero’s expression of mankind’s dominion over the land 
and sea is biblical, as is the proof of God’s existence from the signs of creation.  
 The most emphatic of this set of imperatives, insiste, also appears beside a passage that 
would echo strongly in a Christian reader’s mind. At 84v, the annotator urges readers to dwell on 
(literally, “stand on top of”) a Platonic proof of the eternal nature of souls:  
Quod semper movetur, aeternum est; quod autem motum adfert alicui quodque ipsum 
agitatur aliunde, quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. solum 
igitur, quod se ipsum movet, quia numquam deseritur a se, numquam ne moveri quidem 
desinit; quin etiam ceteris quae moventur hic fons, hoc principium est movendi. principii 
autem nulla est origo; nam e principio oriuntur omnia, ipsum autem nulla ex re alia 
nasci potest; nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliunde. Quod si numquam 
oritur, ne occidit quidem umquam; nam principium extinctum nec ipsum ab alio 
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renascetur, nec ex se aliud creabit, siquidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. ita fit, ut 
motus principium ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur; id autem nec nasci potest nec mori, 
vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura et consistat necesse est nec vim ullam 
nanciscatur, qua a primo inpulsa moveatur. Cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse, quod se 
ipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? inanimum est enim 
omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur interiore et 
suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis. Quae si est una ex omnibus quae se 
ipsa semper moveat, neque nata certe est et aeterna est.  
(Tusc. 1.53-54) 
 
That which is always in motion is eternal. Moreover, that which effects motion in 
something else and which itself derives motion from somewhere, must necessarily end its 
life when its motion had ended. Only that which moves itself, therefore, never stops 
moving, since it never is severed from itself. Indeed, this is the source and origin of 
everything else that moves. There is nothing that causes this origin, because everything 
comes from this origin; and even it itself cannot come from anything else but itself, 
because it would not be an origin if it came into being from something else. If it never 
began, it certainly would never end, because the origin, when it has been extinguished, 
will not be reborn from anything else, nor will it create anything from itself, since 
everything necessarily came from some origin. Therefore, the origin of motion is that 
which moves itself; and that can neither be born nor die, or all of heaven would 
necessarily topple, all of nature stand still, finding no force by which it might receive the 
initial impulse to move. Since it is obvious, therefore, that whatever moves itself is 
eternal, who could deny that this characteristic has not been given to souls? Everything 
that is moved by some outside impulse is inanimate, and an animate object is that which 
put in motion by its own internal stimulation, because that is the appropriate nature and 
power of the soul. But if it is the one thing out of everything that always moves itself, 
surely it was not born; it is eternal.  
 
The marked selection is a quotation that Cicero has translated from the Phaedrus (Phaedr. 245) 
in which Plato argues that anything that can move itself is necessarily eternal, and therefore the 
human soul is eternal. Christianity of all periods has been greatly concerned with the immortality 
of souls, and the Christian annotator understandably found the support of two giants of the 
classical world noteworthy. The intensity of the imperative bespeaks both the annotator’s own 
interest in the passage and his sense of the need for care in reading Plato’s occasionally intricate 
logic. 
  23 
 The purpose of the imperatives to the reader, and especially of the longer imperatives, 
seems to be to encourage care and reflection on passages that provide classical support for 
Christian ideas about the soul and cosmology. The weak imperative nota in its ligatured form is 
linked less to specific topics than to encapsulations of long discussions of a given subject.  
 
The Anchora Superior 
 The least common of the marginal notes in the Gembloux manuscript 
of the Tusculans is what Isidore calls the anchora superior. The form of the 
notation is a vertical line that splits at the top into two curls (Figure 10). The line may 
also be elongated to annotate a larger swath of text (Figure 11). Isidore’s explanation of 
the sign is short and leaves a great deal of room for interpretation: anchora superior 
ponitur ubi aliqua res magna omnino est (the anchora superior is located where 
something universally important is discussed; XXI.24), and he couples it with his description of 
the same sign upside down: Anchora inferior, ubi aliquid vilissime vel inconvenientius 
denuntiatum est (the anchora inferior, where something excessively sordid or unbefitting has 
been denounced; XXI.25). Inconvenientius could mean “unsuitable” in the sense of “morally 
unsuitable” or more neutrally in the sense of “inappropriate to the topic at hand:” in any case, the 
annotator deemed nothing in the Tusculans guilty of either problem. The visual relationship 
between the two signs, however, and Isidore’s related treatment the two of them make them 
appear to be opposite ends of the same spectrum: if the anchora inferior denotes a topic too 
unseemly for a reader, the anchora superior probably marks a particularly laudable sentiment or 
topic. The criterion for employing the anchora superior, then, seems to be an important topic or 
argument, the sentiment of which the annotator endorses.  
Figure 10 
Figure 11 
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 Within the Tusculans manuscript itself, the infrequency of the sign makes it difficult to 
generalize too broadly about its meaning to the annotator. Since it only appears twice, however, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that it was reserved as an extremely high level of approbation: 
only a very select set of passages in the work merit the distinction of the anchora superior.  
 The first appearance of the sign is in the middle margin of 95v, where it marks a passage 
on the Stoic conception of evil: Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum est; nos autem id 
agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Nam ut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, 
sanum non est, sic in animo ista mediocritas caret sanitate. (For every evil, even if it is a 
moderate one, is still a great matter,15 because our aim is that there should be no evil whatsoever 
in the wise man. Just as the body is not healthy even if it only moderately sick, even so that very 
moderation in the soul is unhealthy; Tusc. 3.22). The passage has balance and rhetorical power, 
and sentiment might well be considered res magna by a Christian annotator concerned with the 
nature of sin and its relationship to the soul, as well as res magna omnino, that is, an idea with 
general applicability.  
 The other anchora superior appears on 106v, where it marks a purple passage on the 
importance of philosophy:  
in eundem portum ex quo eramus egressi, magna iactati tempestate confugimus. 
O vitae philosophia dux, o virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum! quid non 
modo nos, sed omnino vita hominum sine te esse potuisset? Tu urbis peperisti, tu 
dissipatos homines in societatem vitae convocasti... (Tusc. 5.5)  
 
Battered by a great storm, I take refuge in the same port from which I had 
embarked. O philosophy, guide of life, investigator of virtue, and banisher of 
vices! Without you, what would I have been—not only myself, but the life of 
people in general? You are the mother of cities, you have convened scattered 
mankind into the companionship of life... 
                                                
15 Later editions accept Bouhier’s emendation from magnum to malum (“every evil, even a 
moderate one, is still an evil”). The Gembloux manuscript coincides with the other manuscripts, 
however, and the sense of the passage with magnum does not suffer in the least.   
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The Gembloux annotator was not the only person to have been struck by this passage and its 
elevated, poetic apostrophe to philosophy. It seems to have been one of the most famous 
passages from the Tusculans during the period: Sedulius Scottus includes it in his florilegium 
(81.16), the author of the Regensburger Rhetorischen Briefe quotes from it,16 and the epithet for 
philosophy as dux vitae or magistra vitae had general currency in the Middle Ages.17 The 
passages justifies the study of philosophy, and thus to some extent the study of the Tusculans 
themselves. If philosophy and the contemplative life represent a haven amid the storms of life, 
then the task of reading and annotating a work of philosophy—even a pagan one—might be seen 
as important and fulfilling.  
 The topics of both passages quoted above have general significance, that is, both apply to 
mankind writ large rather than to a select few who are interested in a specific topic. This 
universality may itself be a qualification of a passage for the anchora superior. Isidore’s res 
magna omnino can mean “a matter that is altogether great” or “a great matter in general,” and the 
word omnino appears in both passages of the Tusculans marked by the anchora. A general 
significance seems not to be the only criterion for using the sign—after all, Cicero uses the word 
omnino 17 times in the Tusculans’ first book alone, and none of its appearances there are 
marked—but for a topic to be considered res magna omnino, it seems likely that it would refer to 
humanity as a whole, as both of the marked passages do.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 Jaeger 121. 
 
17 Jaeger 119.  
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DM and M 
 The final sign I will treat is the marginal notation of an m or a dm (Figures 12 
and 13), usually in an uncial script, but sometimes in Caroline minuscule. The two 
notations appear 17 times apiece in the manuscript, and should be understood as alternate forms 
of a single sign indicating the same thing, since the m almost invariably appears when 
a dm is nearby, either on the same leaf or on the facing leaf, and seems to be nothing 
more than a shorthand version of the dm. The 34 appearances of the sign make it the 
most frequently occurring note in the Gembloux Tusculans.  
 Although the sign appears not uncommonly in books of the 12th century,18 the meaning of 
the dm has only been explained fairly recently. Teresa Webber identifies 25 books from 
Salisbury Cathedral containing the notation,19 and in one manuscript of the 12th century, the note 
is twice written out in full as dignum memoriae (worthy of remembering; MS 191, fos. 115 and 
121).20 The majority of the dm notations appear in patristic works, in which context “such 
annotations had a specific function: to identify sententiae as auctoritates—texts which could be 
excerpted from their immediate context within the works of an auctor, and employed elsewhere 
as authoritative in their own right.”21 Webber finds that the passages marked by the sign in 
Salisbury have in particular a kind of practical spiritual authority, since memorization, to a 
medieval reader, “implied the will to put what had been memorized into practice.”22  
                                                
18 Webber 133. 
 
19 Webber 132. 
 
20 See N. R. Ker, “Salisbury Cathedral Manuscripts,” 154 n. 3. 
 
21 Webber 134; see also Chenu 109-13. 
 
22 Webber 134.  
Figure 12 
Figure 13 
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The 11th-century annotators at Gembloux seem to have used the same sign with even 
more emphatic meaning: Robert Babcock located an instance of the sign written out in Brussels, 
Royal Library, MS 5499 (Origenes, Homeliae in Genesi), an 11th-century Gembloux manuscript, 
as da memoriae (commit to memory). The lone m is not written out anywhere in the 11th-century 
Gembloux manuscripts that I have found, but one may infer that it stands for memora 
(memorize). To the Gembloux annotators, apparently, the dm signified such importance that the 
marked passage was not merely to be noted and recalled by the reader, but actually to be 
memorized. Furthermore, Babcock finds evidence that readers at Gembloux in fact obeyed the 
marginal injunction. In the Gembloux edition of Statius’ Thebaid (Brussels 5337-8), the phrase 
nequit iram explere potestas (their power could not satisfy their wrath; 1.623) bears the dm note. 
That phrase is quoted only once in extant medieval literature—in his Vita Theodardi, Sigebert of 
Gembloux quotes it verbatim, having evidently taken to heart the order to memorize Statius’ turn 
of phrase.23 Readers at the Gembloux scriptorium took this sign seriously, and it is reasonable to 
extend that conclusion to the other marginal notes as well.  
The usage of such a sign would naturally relate to as many different topics as the 
annotator deemed worthy to be memorized. Among the Salisbury manuscripts, Webber does not 
find “one criterion” in the annotator’s non-systematic process of selection of passages to mark 
with the dm, but “certain preferences and special interests emerge,” such as “an interest in 
pastoral problems and pastoral activity, [which] appears to lie behind the noting of many 
sententiae.”24 Similarly, the usage in the Tusculans does not follow a single specific topic (as 
                                                
23 Babcock, talk given at the XVIIIth Colloque International de Paléographie, St. Gall, Sept. 13, 
2014. 
 
24 Webber 135.  
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does, for instance, the y), but certain subjects and disputative techniques seem to garner more 
interest than others.  
Where the y tended to mark discussions of the properties of the soul, the dm/m seems to 
mark proofs and discussion of the soul’s separation from the body at death. A dm accompanies 
Socrates’ response when asked about his own funerary preparations: 
‘Multam vero' inquit 'operam, amici, frustra consumpsi; Critoni enim nostro non 
persuasi me hinc avolaturum neque mei quicquam relicturum. Verum tamen, 
Crito, si me adsequi potueris aut sicubi nanctus eris, ut tibi videbitur, sepelito. 
Sed, mihi crede, nemo me vestrum, cum hinc excessero, consequetur.' (Tusc. 
1.103; 87r).  
 
‘I sure have wasted a great deal of effort, my friends,’ said [Socrates], ‘since I 
have not persuaded our friend Crito that I will fly away from here and leave 
nothing of myself behind. Even so, Crito, if you have procured or acquired my 
body, bury me wherever seems good to you, but believe me: none of you will 
follow me once I have left here.’  
 
The annotator found this quotation drawn from Greek literature worthy of memorization, and 
likewise he marked with a dm on the same folio Leonidas’ famous rallying cry: quid ille dux 
Leonidas dicit? 'pergite animo forti, Lacedaemonii, hodie apud inferos fortasse cenabimus' 
(what does the famous general Leonidas say? ‘Onward with stout heart, Spartans, for today 
perhaps we will banquet among the shades;’ Tusc. 1.101). Again on the same folio, the annotator 
marks with an m an anecdote about the philosopher Theodorus: cui cum Lysimachus rex crucem 
minaretur,'istis, quaeso' inquit 'ista horribilia minitare purpuratis tuis: Theodori quidem nihil 
interest, humine an sublime putescat' (when King Lysimachus threatened him with crucifixion, 
he said ‘Go ahead and threaten those courtiers of yours with these terrifying things, but to 
Theodorus, it makes no difference, whether he rots on the ground or aloft;’ Tusc. 1.101). All 
three quotations come from Greek literature and philosophy and feature a Greek discussing his 
existence after death; all three appear as literary support for Cicero’s argument that the soul 
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separates from the body at death; the Gembloux annotator marked all three as memoranda. On 
the following folio as well, a dm appears opposite a passage conceding that funeral rites should 
be observed: quantum autem consuetudini famaeque dandum sit, id curent vivi, sed ita, ut 
intellegant nihil id ad mortuos pertinere (let the living concern themselves with what must be 
granted to custom and reputation, but let them do it in such a way that they understand that it 
makes no difference to the dead; Tusc. 1.109). The frequency of the notes in this section, which 
discusses the separate existence of body and soul after death, indicates a certain preference for 
this topic on the annotator’s part.  
 Another such preference seems to be for passages that discuss the desirability of death 
when one is at the height of virtue or glory. The m appears on 88v opposite Cicero’s lament 
about outliving a suitable time for death: nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis perfectae perfecto 
functus est munere. Multa mihi ipsi ad mortem tempestiva fuerunt, quam utinam potuissem 
obire! (No one who has completely fulfilled his duty of complete virtue has died too soon. In my 
own case, there were many times when death would have been timely; if only I could have died 
then! Tusc. 1.109). Again on the same folio, a laconic Laconian advises a proud father to die as 
soon as possible: cum Rhodius Diagoras, Olympionices nobilis, uno die duo suos filios victores 
Olympiae vidisset, accessit ad senem et gratulatus: 'morere Diagora' inquit; 'non enim in caelum 
ascensurus es' (when Diagoras of Rhodes, a renowned Olympic victor, saw two of his sons win 
at Olympia on the same day, [the Spartan] approached the old man and said by way of 
congratulations, ‘Die, Diagoras; you are not going to ascend into heaven;’ Tusc. 1.111).  
Even without virtue and glory, an early death is advisable to Cicero’s interlocutor and 
notable to Gembloux’s annotator. Again on the facing page, the annotator marks the famous 
dictum of Silenus with a dm sign: adfertur etiam de Sileno fabella quaedam: qui cum a Mida 
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captus esset, hoc ei muneris pro sua missione dedisse scribitur: docuisse regem non nasci 
homini longe optimum esse, proximum autem quam primum mori (there is also a certain tale 
about Silenus, who was captured by Midas, and in exchange for his release, it is written that he 
gave him this favor: he told the king that it is by far the best thing for a human never to be born, 
but the next best thing is to die as soon as possible; Tusc. 1.114). On the same page, the 
annotator marks a quotation from Crantor’s Consolatio to the same effect: Ignaris homines in 
vita mentibus errant: / Euthynous potitur fatorum numine leto. / Sic fuit utilius finiri ipsique 
tibique (in life, people wander with heedless minds: / Euthynous masters the divinity of the fates 
by his death. / It is thus more profitable to die, both for him and for you; Tusc. 1.115). Finally, a 
story on 88r almost identical to that of Cleobis and Biton bears an m mark: simili precatione 
Trophonius et Agamedes usi dicuntur; qui cum Apollini Delphis templum exaedificavissent, 
venerantes deum petiverunt mercedem non parvam quidem operis et laboris sui: nihil certi, sed 
quod esset optimum homini (Trophonius and Agamedes used a similar prayer, it is said. When 
they had finished building the temple at Apollo at Delphi, they entreated the god, requesting no 
small reward for their toil and accomplishment: nothing defined, but ‘that which was best for a 
person;’ Tusc. 1.114). Apollo agrees; three days later, the men are found dead. As Cicero 
presents it, Apollo implies that death is absolutely the best thing for man, and the annotations 
exhort the reader to commit the anecdotes to memory.  
The annotator also shows his predilection for arguments that happiness derives from 
merely having enough, not from excess. A prolonged section of Book 5 deals with need as the 
only necessary condiment (desideriis omnia ista condiri, 5.97), and the m appears beside three 
passages from this section on folio 112v. Cicero relates the story of Darius in flight: Darius in 
fuga cum aquam turbidam et cadaveribus inquinatam bibisset, negavit umquam se bibisse 
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iucundius: numquam videlicet sitiens biberat (during his retreat, after Darius had drunk water 
that was murky and befouled by corpses, he said that he had never drunk anything more 
pleasing; obviously, he had never taken a drink when he was truly thirsty; Tusc. 5.97). Socrates 
practices a similar principle to whet his appetite:  Socraten ferunt, cum usque ad vesperum 
contentius ambularet quaesitumque esset ex eo, quare id faceret, respondisse se, quo melius 
cenaret, obsonare ambulando famem (they say that when Socrates was asked why he would 
walk fairly vigorously into the evening, he answered that he worked up his appetite by walking, 
and dined better by doing so; Tusc. 5.97). A little further on the page, the Spartans teach the 
same lesson to their guest:  
Ubi cum tyrannus cenavisset Dionysius, negavit se iure illo nigro, quod cenae 
caput erat, delectatum. Tum is qui illa coxerat: 'Minime mirum; condimenta enim 
defuerunt.' 'Quae tandem?' inquit ille. 'Labor in venatu, sudor, cursus ad 
Eurotam, fames, sitis; his enim rebus Lacedaemoniorum epulae condiuntur.' 
(Tusc. 5.97) 
 
When the tyrant Dionysius had eaten, he said he did not like the black broth that 
had been the main course. The man who had cooked it said ‘No wonder! You 
didn’t have the seasoning.’ ‘What seasoning?’ said the other. ‘The struggle of the 
hunt, sweat, running to the Eurotas, hunger, thirst—with these things Spartans’ 
feasts are seasoned.’ 
 
Cicero uses all three anecdotes from the Greek world to substantiate his point that the soul 
derives pleasure from the anticipation of satisfaction of a need. 
 A survey of the passages marked by the dm/m notes reveals a number of general links on 
a broader level than the subject matter. All of the passages above, for example, are in the form of 
quotations and anecdotes, and all of them are drawn from the Greek world. Regardless of the 
topic of the quotation or story, certain features seem to be particularly noteworthy to the 
annotator, such as the customs and sayings of the Spartans. Already quoted passages include 
Leonidas’ speech to his troops (87r, Tusc. 1.101), the Spartan’s response to the Olympic victor 
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(88v, 1.111), and the Spartan cook’s description of condimenta (112v, Tusc. 5.97). Similarly, the 
annotator has placed an m beside a passage on 87r that retells the story of a bereaved Spartan 
woman: qualis tandem Lacaena? quae cum filium in proelium misisset et interfectum 
audisset,'idcirco' inquit 'genueram, ut esset, qui pro patria mortem non dubitaret occumbere' 
(what sort too was the Spartan woman? When she had sent her son into battle and heard that he 
had been killed, she said ‘That is why I bore him, to be the sort of man who would not hesitate to 
die on behalf of his homeland;’ Tusc. 1.102). The phlegmatic Spartan character is marked again 
at 91v:  Spartae vero pueri ad aram sic verberibus accipiuntur 'ut multus e visceribus sanguis 
exeat,' nonnumquam etiam, ut, cum ibi essem, audiebam, ad necem; quorum non modo nemo 
exclamavit umquam, sed ne ingemuit quidem (the boys of Sparta receive blows at the altar to the 
point ‘that a great deal of blood oozes from their innards,’ sometimes even, as I heard when I 
was there, to death. Not only do none of them ever cry out, but none so much as whimpers; Tusc. 
2.34). The annotations reveal that the Spartan ethos was a source of fascination for the annotator 
to the point that he recommended the memorization of these passages to other readers. 
 Another commonly marked source of quotations and anecdotes are Greek philosophers, 
especially Socrates.  His ambulatory aperitif (112v, Tusc. 5.97) has already been quoted, as has 
his reply to Crito’s question about burial rites (87r, Tusc. 1.103). The annotator also encouraged 
the memorization of the following anecdote on 99v about Socrates and his rich young pupil 
Alcibiades:  
Quid enim dicemus, cum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil 
hominis esse nec quicquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis 
baiulum interesse, cum se Alcibiades adflictaret lacrimansque Socrati supplex 
esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret,—quid dicemus, 
Cleanthe? Num in illa re, quae aegritudine Alcibiadem adficiebat, mali nihil 
fuisse? (Tusc. 3.77) 
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For what will we say, when we learn that Socrates proved to Alcibiades that he 
was not a man and that there was no difference between an Alcibiades born in the 
height of privilege and some workman; and when Alcibiades was agitated about 
this and begged Socrates in tears to teach him virtue and remove his iniquity—
what will we say, Cleanthes? Was there not something bad in that thing that 
afflicted Alcibiades with disquiet? 
 
No other dm/m marginal notes appear in this section of the discussion, and so it seems that the 
marked passage was selected not for the point it illustrates in the particular disputation but for its 
depiction of Socrates. So too at 112r, where a dm marks a quotable line from Socrates: Socrates 
quidem cum rogaretur, cuiatem se esse diceret, 'mundanum' inquit; totius enim mundi se incolam 
et civem arbitrabatur (when Socrates was asked where he would say he comes from, he replied 
‘from the world;’ for he judged that he was an inhabitant and a citizen of the whole world; Tusc. 
5.108). Nearly as often as he marked Spartan anecdotes and quotations, the annotator marked the 
words and deeds of Socrates.   
 Although the annotations display a special interest in Socrates, quotations from a number 
of ancient authors appear with an m or a dm. As discussed above, Cicero quotes from Crantor’s 
Consolatio at Tusculans 1.115, marked with an m on 88r, and from Ennius at Tusculans 1.107, 
marked with an m on 87r. On 89r, the dm marks a quotation from the 2nd-century B.C. tragic poet 
Accius: nam ut agri non omnes frugiferi sunt qui coluntur, falsumque illud Accii: 'Probae etsi in 
segetem sunt deteriorem datae / fruges, tamen ipsae suapte natura enitent,' sic animi non omnes 
culti fructum ferunt (for just as not all fields that are cultivated bear fruit, and that line of Accius’ 
is false: ‘good crops, even planted in a worse field, / still shine forth by their own nature;’ even 
so, not all minds that are cultivated bear fruit; Tusc. 2.13).  
 Of the marked passages that do not feature Socrates, Spartans, or ancient quotations, most 
are thoughts of Cicero’s that are themselves pithy and quotable. At 92v, for instance, the 
annotator has marked an elevated passage about ratio personified: sed praesto est domina 
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omnium et regina ratio, quae conixa per se et progressa longius fit perfecta virtus. Haec ut 
imperet illi parti animi quae oboedire debet, id videndum est viro (but close by stands the 
mistress and queen of everything, Reason, who struggles on by her own power and, when she 
has advanced further, becomes perfect virtue. A man must see to it that she rule that part of the 
soul which ought to obey; Tusc. 2.47). The personification of reason and virtue is striking and 
quotable, and the practical advice to train one’s mind to obey reason could be part of a moral 
education. The use of the sign here supports Webber’s assessment of the practice of 
memorization by medieval readers, the idea that “what had been consigned to memory could 
involve not only living it in one’s own life but teaching it to others.”25 Other instances of the sign 
in the Tusculans mark thoughts of Cicero that must have been deemed quotable, because they are 
indeed quoted. The first dm in the manuscript is on 80r, where Cicero argues for good style in all 
writing, even writing of philosophy:  
fieri autem potest, ut recte quis sentiat et id quod sentit polite eloqui non possit; 
sed mandare quemquam litteris cogitationes suas, qui eas nec disponere nec 
inlustrare possit nec delectatione aliqua allicere lectorem, hominis est 
intemperanter abutentis et otio et litteris. (Tusc. 1.6) 
 
It can also happen that someone notices something correctly but cannot express 
what he notices in a refined way. But committing one’s thoughts to writing when 
one cannot arrange or elucidate them properly or entice the reader with some kind 
of appeal is characteristic of a man who immoderately misuses both leisure and 
literature.  
 
This passage is quoted by Einhard in the prologue to his Vita Karoli Magni, where he quotes 
verbatim from mandare to the end of the passage, and even attributes it accurately to the first 
book of the Tusculans, as well as by the prolific theologian Rupert of Deutz, who was a student 
                                                
25 Webber 134.  
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at Liège in the 11th century.26 Some readers, clearly, were taking these passages to heart. A dm-
marked passage on 102v discusses the many internal dangers that pose no threat to the Stoic wise 
man:  
Ergo, hic, quisquis est qui moderatione et constantia quietus animo est sibique 
ipse placatus, ut nec tabescat molestiis nec frangatur timore nec sitienter quid 
expetens ardeat desiderio nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat, is est sapiens 
quem quaerimus, is est beatus, cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad 
demittendum animum aut nimis laetabile ad ecferendum videri potest. (Tusc. 
4.37) 
 
Therefore, whoever is serene in his soul because of self-restraint and resolve and 
is content with himself, so that he neither dissolves from vexations nor is 
shattered by fear nor burns thirstily with longing for what he wants nor falls to 
pieces, itching with some bootless enthusiasm, he is the wise man for whom we 
are searching, he is blessed, for whom no state of human affairs can seem so 
unbearable as to lower his spirits nor seem so delightful as to lift them up.  
 
Rupert paraphrases this passage in his De Sancta Trinitate, transferring the attributes of Cicero’s 
wise man to the Christian who trusts in God (XX.264).  
In both the above cases, Rupert found that a passage from the Tusculans could be lifted 
out of context and used to serve his own purposes. This seems to be the unifying factor for all the 
appearances of the dm/m sign: all the marked passages may be removed from their original 
source and context and still carry weight in their own right. In the case of Cicero’s quotations of 
other authors and presentations of anecdotes from Greek history, the passages’ ability to be 
excerpted is clear: Cicero has removed the passages from their original context and arranged 
them to support his own point. Just as Cicero calls from his memory a story about Spartan boys 
he heard during his travels, the annotator enjoins with the m and the dm subsequent readers to 
memorize the same story and employ it for some other end. The m and the dm emphatically 
                                                
26 For Rupert’s biography, see van Engen. Rupert may have borrowed from Einhard more 
directly than from Cicero, but his interest in the sentiment is still clear. 
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encourage the reader to build a memory bank of anecdotes, quotations, and turns of phrase that 
are applicable to a broad range of scenarios.   
 
 The Letter Y  
 
 Of the two annotations in the Tusculans that are absent from Isidore, 
the more mysterious is the letter y that appears in the margins 21 times in 
Book 1, once in Book 2, and never again after that. The only sign in Isidore’s Etymologiae that 
bears even a passing resemblance to the y-note is the antigraphus, but the note in the Tusculans is 
clearly conceived of as the same letter y that appears within the text itself, 
complete with the dot above the fork of the y (compare Figure 14, 
the marginal notation, to Figure 15, a y in the text). Like the other 
annotations with tails, the y may be elongated to mark a more extensive passage 
(Figure 16). Given the deficiency of evidence for the sign’s meaning relative to the 
other notations discussed in this paper, I will discuss the y at greater length and treat 
more examples of its usage. 
 Despite its frequency, the y is confined to a more circumscribed space of the 
work as a whole than any of the other marginal notations. All 22 occurrences of the sign come 
between 82v and 89r, a space of 16 leaves. The organization of the Tusculans is such that each 
book deals at length with a single subject—Book 1 with death, Book 2 with pain, Book 3 with 
grief, Book 4 with the passions, and Book 5 with happiness through a virtuous life. Since the y-
note is almost exclusive to Book 1, it seems to be linked more than any other annotation to a 
specific topic. Furthermore, the topic must not be death itself, the subject of Book 1, or every 
Figure 14 
Figure 15 
Figure 16 
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passage in the book would be marked. Instead, the sign must deal with a single topic that relates 
closely to death and appears frequently in Cicero’s discussion of it. Overwhelmingly often—19 
out of 22 times—the passages accompanied by the y-note deal with the nature of the human soul.  
 The body of passages marked by the y may be broken down into a few aspects of the 
nature and attributes of the soul. Two passages deal with the soul’s ability to sense. At 83r (Tusc. 
1.46, quoted supra in the section on imperatives; the y coincides with the word nota), Cicero 
describes ancient physicians’ discovery of viae perforatae from the eyes, nose, etc. to the soul, 
and at 82v, he alludes to an ancient belief in sensation in death: Itaque unum illud erat insitum 
priscis illis, quos ‘cascos’ appellat Ennius, esse in mortem sensum neque excessu vitae sic deleri 
hominem, ut funditus interiret (and so the belief had been adopted by the ancients, whom Ennius 
calls the ‘men of yore,’ that there exists even in death the ability to sense, and man is not so 
completely destroyed by his departure from life that he dies completely; Tusc. 1.27). Both 
passages describe primordial beliefs in the soul as the seat of sensation in humans. 
 A related attribute, the soul’s ability to move, is also noted on a pair of occasions by the 
annotator. At 82v, Cicero describes the soul in a state of perpetual motion: et sic ipsum animum 
ἐνδελέχεια appellat novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perhennem (...and 
therefore [Aristotle] describes the soul itself with the new term ‘continuity,’ i.e., a certain 
continued and eternal movement; Tusc. 1.22). Cicero seems to have bungled his Aristotle, 
confusing ἐνδελέχεια (‘continuity’) with ἐντελέχεια (‘perfection’ or ‘completion’)—after all, 
“Aristotle denies any movement to the soul.”27 Nevertheless, Cicero is ready to explain the term 
he thinks is Aristotle’s, and the idea of the soul in motion is important to Cicero’s understanding 
of death, because without the ability to move, there is no existence after death. He uses the soul 
                                                
27 King (1927) 28 fn. 1.  
 
  38 
in motion to prove that eternity exists in Tusculans 1.55 (84v), another passage marked with the 
y-sign:  
 
non modo nihil umquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum 
quam subtiliter conclusum sit intellegent. sentit igitur animus se moveri; quod 
cum sentit, illud una sentit, se vi sua, non aliena moveri, nec accidere posse ut 
ipse umquam a se deseratur. ex quo efficitur aeternitas, nisi quid habes ad haec. 
 
Not only will [philosophers who are inferior to Plato and Socrates28] never 
explain anything so elegantly, but they will not even realize how keenly this 
matter has been resolved. The soul, then, senses that it is in motion, and because it 
senses this, it senses at the same time that it moves by its own power, not 
something else’s, and that it is impossible for it to be severed from itself. Unless 
you have something to respond to this, this argument proves the existence of 
eternity. 
 
Cicero’s extension of Plato’s argument (which is itself marked by the command insiste, 
discussed in the section on imperative annotations) is that since the soul cannot be divorced from 
itself and its essential property of motion, the soul’s sensation of its own motion proves the 
existence of eternity. At 85v (Tusc. 1.79-80), Cicero lists Panaetius' arguments that the soul is 
mortal (contra Plato) and provides the Platonic refutation of those arguments. At 83v (Tusc. 
1.39), Cicero credits the oldest argument for the eternity of human souls to Pherecydes Syrius. 
The annotator marked with the y-annotation all these passages that contain quotations by the 
ancient philosophers, indicating a special interest in classical philosophical proofs of the eternity 
of the soul.  
A similar object of interest and concern for the annotator is the actual physical location 
and composition of the soul. On 82v, Cicero briefly takes up the subject of the seat of the soul as 
part of a proof that death need not be feared: nam si cor aut sanguis aut cerebrum est animus, 
certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore (for if the soul is the heart or the blood 
                                                
28 I.e., all philosophers, in Cicero’s view; Tusc. 1.22.  
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or the brain, surely it will die along with the rest of the body, since it is a part of the body; Tusc. 
1.24). As I noted above, Cicero goes on to reject these loci for the soul, following Plato’s proof 
that the soul is eternal and therefore does not perish along with the body. 
The annotator likewise marks heavily with the y-sign Cicero’s discussion of the soul’s 
physical makeup. At 83v, he marked a passage in which Cicero wonders whether the soul is a 
quintessence: si vero aut numerus quidam est animus, quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide 
dicitur, aut quinta illa non nominata magis quam non intellecta natura (...but if the soul is a 
certain number, which it is called more with subtlety than with clarity, or if it is some fifth 
essence, unnamed rather than not understood...; Tusc. 1.41). Again, the marked passage has to do 
with ideas about the soul derived from Greek philosophy: the image here is drawn from 
Aristotle’s idea of a quintessence, a fifth element made up of neither earth, air, fire, nor water. 
Shortly after this passage, on the same folio, the y appears beside a rejection of an atomic 
visualization of the soul: illam vero funditus eiciamus individuorum corporum levium et 
rotundorum concursionem fortuitam (then let us completely dismiss the notion that [the soul is] 
the random concurrence of light, round atoms; Tusc. 1.42). Again, Cicero refers to the soul as it 
is conceived in Greek philosophy, this time rejecting the views of the atomic theorist 
Democritus, from whose theories the Epicurean school borrowed extensively. On one y-marked 
occasion, Cicero rejects the possibility of any sort of earthly origin for the soul. At 84r, Cicero 
quotes from the Consolatio, his own lost work: nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum 
aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, nihil ne aut umidum quidem aut flabile aut 
igneum (there is no mixture or combination in souls, nor anything that seems to have been born 
or shaped out of earth, nor for that matter anything moist, airy, or fiery; Tusc. 1.66). Since it is 
clearly not earthly, the makeup of the soul proves its divine origin, as Cicero goes on to argue: on 
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85v, later on in the same quotation from the Consolatio (discussed above), a second y appears 
beside a proof of the soul’s divinity. 
quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, caeleste et 
divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est. nec vero deus ipse, qui 
intellegitur a nobis, alio modo intellegi potest nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera, 
segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens ipsaque 
praedita motu sempiterno. (Tusc. 1.66) 
 
Whatever senses, discerns, lives, and thrives, must necessarily be heavenly and 
divine, and for that reason be eternal. Nor indeed could God himself, whom we 
perceive, be perceived in any way but by the kind of mind that is free and 
uninhibited, separate from all mortal matter, sensing everything, moving 
everything, and endowed with its own eternal motion. 
 
The annotator’s decision to use two separate y-signs in short succession indicates that he thinks 
that the two attributes of the soul that Cicero discusses are distinct and each deserve a mark. The 
y, then, indicates more in the Tusculans manuscript than merely “the subject of this passage is 
the soul;” rather, an appearance of the y seems to alert the reader to a discussion of a specific 
attribute of the soul.   
Another use of the y-sign is to mark instances of the soul being used as an analogy to 
understand God, and vice versa. At Tusculans 1.70-71 (marked with an elongated y on 85v), he 
appeals to his interlocutor’s belief in the divine in order to support the understanding of the soul:  
ut deum noris, etsi eius ignores et locum et faciem, sic animum tibi tuum notum 
esse oportere, etiamsi ignores et locum et formam. In animi autem cognitione 
dubitare non possumus, nisi plane in physicis plumbei sumus, quin nihil sit animis 
admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex: 
quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni, nec dividi, nec discerpi, nec distrahi potest. 
 
Just as you know God even though you do not know his location or appearance, 
your own soul should be familiar to you the same way, even if you do not know 
its location or form. In our understanding of the soul, we cannot doubt, even if we 
are total numbskulls in the discipline of physics, that there is no mixture in souls, 
no combination, no conjunction, no coagulation, no bipartition. Since such is the 
case, surely it cannot be separated, divided, picked or torn apart.  
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The passage may be marked, like the preceding passages quoted, for its discussion of the 
characteristics of the soul, or possibly for its analogy between knowledge of the soul and 
knowledge of God, or most likely for the combination of the two. The same coincidence of 
topics is marked on 84v: nisi enim, quod numquam vidimus, id quale sit intellegere non 
possumus, certe et deum ipsum et divinum animum corpore liberatum cogitatione complecti 
possumus (for unless we cannot understand what we have never seen, surely we can comprehend 
in thought both God himself and a divine soul distinct from the body; Tusc. 1.51). On 85v, 
immediately after his proof of God by the complexity of the cosmos (quoted above and marked 
with attende), Cicero uses the same argument again:  
sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non vides, tamen, ut deum 
adgnoscis ex operibus eius, sic ex memoria rerum et inventione et celeritate 
motus omnique pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis adgnoscito. (Tusc. 1.70) 
 
Just so the human mind, even though you do not see it, just as you do not see God 
but you nevertheless recognize that there is a god from his works, just so you will 
recognize the divine power of the mind from its memory, its imagination, its 
speed of movement, and every beauty of virtue.  
 
The nature of the mind and the soul are intimately bound up with the nature of the divine, both 
for Cicero in the Tusculans and for the annotator reading him at Gembloux.  
  The vast bulk of the y-notes in the Tusculans, then, deal with the general topic of the 
soul. There are a small number of exceptions, however, which deal only obliquely with the soul 
(as nearly any given passage in Book 1 does). At two places, the y appears opposite an 
affirmation of natural law. At 82r, the sign marks omni autem in re consensio omnium gentium 
lex naturae putanda est (and in every matter, one must suppose that the agreement of all nations 
constitutes a law of nature; Tusc. 1.30). Cicero goes on to argue that since people of all nations 
mourn their dead, the lex naturae of grief proves that 1) the dead have been deprived of the 
goods of life, 2) the dead are sensible of their loss, and therefore 3) the soul must be immortal. 
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Proving an attribute of the soul is the telos of the argument, but the y itself marks only Cicero’s 
definition of lex naturae. Later on the same folio, however, the y notes a more explicit use of 
natural law to prove an attribute of the soul:  
sed ut deos esse natura opinamur, qualesque sint, ratione cognoscimus, sic 
permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium, qua in sede maneant 
qualesque sint, ratione discendum est. (Tusc. 1.36) 
 
But just as we suppose by nature that gods exist and understand by reason what 
sort of beings they are, so we believe by the consensus of all nations that souls are 
permanent, while their location and nature must be discerned through reason. 
 
Here, there is a link to the subject of the soul, but rather than mark descriptions of the soul’s 
divinity, eternity, location, composition, etc., the y-note marks a particular process of discussing 
the soul, namely the invocation of natural law.  
 A few other appearances of the sign are even more removed from the topic of the human 
soul. At 85v (Tusc. 1.74-75), a long-tailed y marks Cicero’s statement that the philosopher’s life 
is entirely a preparation for death (commentatio mortis), and again on 89r, at the sign’s only 
appearance after Book 1, it marks a dictum that a philosopher who does not follow reason in his 
own life is like a tone-deaf musician or a grammarian who speaks ungrammatically (Tusc. 2.12). 
The idea of life as a preparation for death relates tenuously to the character of the soul, but here 
the y-mark notes much less clearly a discussion of the soul per se. Similarly at 83v (Tusc. 1.40), 
where the y highlights a passage inside a larger intende mark about cosmology (the earth is the 
central point of the universe), and at 83v (Tusc. 1.38), where Cicero argues that it is difficult but 
necessary to free the mind from the tyranny of the senses and habits. In both cases, there is a link 
to the soul—the discussion of cosmology leads into a discussion of the divine soul, and the 
properties of mind in the second passage could be seen as properties of the soul as well—but the 
link is less straightforward than the overwhelming bulk of uses of the y-annotation.  
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 In general, then, the annotator associates the y with Cicero’s discussion of the soul and 
with a particular interest in the views of the Greek philosophers about specific characteristics of 
the soul. Cicero’s presentation of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in the Tusculans may have been a 
major conduit of Greek philosophy to 10th and 11th century readers, especially those with limited 
or nonexistent Greek (see the above section on the usage of the phrontis, for example). The usage 
of the y-mark indicates a fairly consistent interest in the major Greek philosophers.   
 
Quotations of the Tusculans 
 Next, I will move beyond the specific manuscript from the abbey at Gembloux to explore 
whether there is broader evidence in the region of Liège for the understanding of the Tusculans 
that I have identified in the critical signs in MS 5348-52. The largest body of evidence comes 
from the quotation of the Tusculans by authors of the period and region. Of the authors 
associated with the Liège diocese, the one who quotes the Tusculan Disputations most heavily is 
Sedulius Scottus, a late 9th-century scholar. He is regarded “as one of the best educated and most 
industrious of Carolingian scholars,”29 in no small part because of the wealth of classical 
material represented in his Collectaneum Miscellaneum, an extensive florilegium. The purpose 
of the collection is not entirely clear, but Simpson argues that “the notion that [it] was a notebook 
into which Sedulius copied whatever interested him cannot be improved upon...nor can it be 
demonstrated that this florilegium was intended to serve as a teaching aid.”30 Sedulius quotes the 
Tusculans 31 times in the collection, and all but five of those quotations appear in a chapter 
devoted exclusively to the Tusculans.  
                                                
29 Simpson xx; see also Laistner 251-2.  
 
30 Simpson xxii. 
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 It is highly likely that Sedulius read a version of the Tusculans that comes from the same 
manuscript tradition as Brussels MS 5348-52. He was intimately connected with Liège, and may 
have been a schoolteacher there,31 and Reynolds finds that his extracts relate textually most 
closely to the Gembloux manuscript of the Tusculans.32 In one case, Sedulius quotes a passage 
from the Tusculans that he may have encountered elsewhere. In a section De Ira, Sedulius quotes 
a line from a story about Archytas, who tells an enemy iam te verberibus enecassem nisi iratus 
essem (I would have already beaten you to death if I were not angry; CM 80.14.9). The story 
appears in Cicero at Tusc. 4.78, but with a slightly different apodosis (quo te modo, inquit, 
accepissem, nisi iratus essem); Sedulius’ more direct source for the quotation seems to have been 
either Jerome (Epistle 79.7) or Lactantius (De Ira Dei 18.4). Rather of Verona, himself a product 
of the Liège diocese, includes the same passage in his Praeloquia, but he has still another 
variation on the first clause (iam te percuterem, nisi iratus essem; 6.7), which may indicate that 
he is using another source altogether or that he is quoting from memory. The second possibility 
is perhaps more likely, since Rather also alludes to the story of Dionysius and Damocles in one 
of his sermons, a story which appears in the Tusculans (5.62), and so Rather seems to have been 
familiar with the work.33  
Sedulius’ interests in the Tusculans apparently include a broad range of topics, although 
the flores of Books 4 and 5 seem to attract him especially. He quotes once from Book 1 and four 
times from Book 3, but all the other passages are drawn from the final two books of the 
Tusculans. Most often (about 14 times), Sedulius quotes definitions or explications of terms, as 
                                                
31 Pirenne 23. 
 
32 Reynolds 133; see also Simpson xxviii. 
33 Dolbeau (1986) 153 identifies some supposed quotations of Cicero in Rather’s writings as 
indirect quotes from patristic sources. 
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at CM 13.25.5: spes est futurarumque bonarum rerum atque ad eum pertinentium qui earum 
spem gerere perhibetur firma exspectatio (hope is the firm expectation of good things to come, 
things which pertain to the one who is allowed to entertain hope of them; cf. Tusc. 4.80). This 
definition comes in a chapter of the Collectaneum labeled De Spe. At 81.7, Sedulius quotes 
Zeno’s definition of perturbation as Cicero relays it: perturbatio est aversa ratione contra 
naturam animi commotio (perturbation is an irrational emotion of the soul contrary to nature; 
Tusc. 4.47). The blessed man is defined at CM 81.6 (Tusc. 4.37), a verbatim quotation discussed 
in the section on the dm sign.  
 In fact, six of the passages quoted by Sedulius in his section on the Tusculans are marked 
with the m or the dm in the Gembloux manuscript. Like the Gembloux annotator, Sedulius seems 
to have been particularly struck by anecdotes about the Greek world. The Collectaneum 
Miscellaneum includes the passages about Spartan condiments (CM 81.22; Tusc. 5.98), Socrates 
walking to whet his appetite (CM 81.26; Tusc. 5.108), and Darius’ delight in drinking muddy 
water during his retreat (CM 81.20; Tusc.5.97), all of which I have discussed above in the section 
on the m/dm sign. Like the Gembloux annotator, Sedulius seems to have been reading the 
Tusculans at least in part as a source of illustrative stories about the ancient world, and especially 
the ancient Greek world.  
  Rupert of Deutz is another writer from the Liège diocese who uses the Tusculans, albeit 
more sparingly than does Sedulius Scottus. Two of these quotations are discussed above in the 
section on the dm signs: he quotes Tusc. 1.6 in his De Incendio Tuitiensi (SS. XII) and 
paraphrases Tusc. 4.37, a passage on perturbation-free man, in his De Sancta Trinitate (XX.264). 
The three other references to the Tusculans in Rupert’s sizable oeuvre are paraphrases, but 
similar enough paraphrases that the Corpus Christianorum Latinorum cites the Tusculans in its 
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apparatus criticus.34 They are not marked in the Gembloux manuscript of the Tusculans. Rupert 
seems to have no particular program in his use of the Tusculans, but he was clearly familiar 
enough with the work to quote it and borrow a philosophical idea, namely that of the Christian as 
a Stoic wise man, free from disturbances of the soul. 
 The Tusculans also appear in passing in a letter by Gozechin, who was born in Liège 
early in the 11th century.35 In a letter to his colleague and former pupil36 Walcher, Gozechin 
defends his desire to return to Liège even as he notes that famous men of antiquity noted that 
physical location did not matter to the wise man. Although the majority of the learned quotations 
in the letter come from scriptural and patristic texts, the examples Gozechin adduces from 
antiquity come from the Tusculans: at 891C-D, for instance, he retells the story of Teucer saying 
that home is wherever all is good (patria est, ubicumque est bene; Tusc. 5.108) and Socrates 
saying that he is a citizen of the world (Tusc. 5.107, discussed above). Even more than Sedulius, 
who merely selects anecdotes as material for his anthology, Gozechin puts the Tusculans to work 
as a source of stories from antiquity. Cicero provides authoritative anecdotes that Gozechin uses 
to support his arguments.  
 Of the 10th- and 11th-century authors from the region of Liège who use the Tusculans, 
Sigebert is the most directly connected with Gembloux, where he was in charge of the abbey’s 
school in the late 11th and early 12th century. In Sigebert’s Passio Thebeorum, the hero Victor 
compares the length of human life with that of the crow and the deer.37 Sigebert’s source for the 
                                                
34 De Sancta Trinitate X.289 (paraphrase of Tusc. 2.18), and the commentary on the Gospel of 
John II.1498 and III.1153 (both loose paraphrases of Tusc. 3.14-15).  
35 Huygens 5. 
 
36 Huygens 3.  
 
37 Pass. Theb. 3.8; see also Jaeger 435-6 n. 7.  
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longevity of these two particular animals seems to be the Tusculans, where Cicero quotes 
Theophrastus: Theophrastus autem moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus 
vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam 
exiguam vitam dedisset (the dying Theophrastus, moreover, is said to have reproached nature for 
giving long life to deer and crows, to whom it does not matter at all, and so little life to humans, 
to whom it matters a great deal; Tusc. 3.69). The passage is marked in the Gembloux manuscript 
with a dm.  
 Finally, Heriger of Lobbes, who taught Olbert, the future abbot of Gembloux, uses the 
Tusculan Disputations in conjunction with a number of other classical authors in his Vita 
Remacli. The prologue to this work, a reworking of a Merovingian hagiography of the same title, 
is “an elaborate pastiche of excerpts from ancient authors,” including Horace, Terence, Martial, 
Claudian and Cicero.38 Heriger’s ten quotations from the Tusculans vary in subject, but often 
center on the soul, as when he quotes Tusc. 2.13: ut ager quamvis fertilis sine cultura fructuosus 
esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus (as even a fertile field cannot be fruitful without 
cultivation, so with a soul without training; Gesta Pontificum Tungrensium sive Leodicensium, p. 
188, lines 26-27). This passage completes the marked one discussed above in the section on the 
dm sign. Later in the same section, Heriger quotes from the discussion of the soul at Tusc. 1.44: 
beati erimus, cum corporibus relictis et cupiditatum et aemulationum expertes fuerimus (we will 
be blessed when our bodies have been left behind and we have been freed from desires and 
envies; Gesta Pontificum Tungrensium sive Leodicensium, p. 188, lines 34-35). This particular 
passage is unmarked in the Gembloux manuscript, but numerous other passages nearby on the 
same topic are marked—see especially the above section on the y-sign. Heriger also reports a 
                                                
38 Babcock 308.  
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tradition that St. Servatius was descended from an aunt of Mary, Mother of God, but in lieu of 
vouching for the tradition, says iuxta Tullium, non debeat pudere nos fateri nescire quod 
nescimus (according to Cicero, we should not be ashamed to confess that we do not know when 
we do not know; p. 172, line 48). The Tusculans passage is marked with a y. Here, Heriger uses 
the passage to avoid wading too deep into problems of theology and orthodoxy by presuming 
more than he ought to about Servatius’ heritage,39 but the passage from which he quotes deals 
with the physical nature of the soul (Tusc. 1.60). Like the Gembloux annotator, Heriger seems to 
find the Tusculans a fertile field for its discussion of the soul both in life and at the moment of 
death, and he uses it in his descriptions of the exemplary lives of saints and abbots. 
 
Conclusion  
 Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations were read in the Liège schools of the 9th to the 11th 
century, like most works, for a wide variety of reasons. Some of its readers use it in their own 
works to lend Cicero’s authority on a number of topics, like the separation of the body and soul 
at death or the importance of good style in writing. It stands to reason that the interests of the 
Gembloux annotator working in a monastic context would differ from those of a contemporary 
encountering the same work in a cathedral school or a secular school. Some of the uses of the 
Tusculans, however, appear both in the Gembloux manuscript’s margins and in the quotations of 
other authors from the region, which indicates that these foci are more widespread.  
 A prime example of these common uses is the mining of the Tusculans for anecdotes and 
biographical tidbits about the ancient world, and in particular about Greek philosophers. The 
                                                
39 The passage is also quoted by Augustine in his De natura et origine animae (1.19.34), which 
may have been Heriger’s more immediate source—there was a manuscript of the work at 
Lobbes. In the Augustinian context, the quotation endorses admitting one’s ignorance for the 
sake of avoiding heresy. 
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annotator marks a large number of anecdotes about Socrates with the dm, one of his strongest 
exhortations to readers, and many authors from the Liège diocese employ these anecdotes in 
their own works. The Greek philosophers’ lives appealed widely to the readers of the time and 
place: a manuscript of Chalcidius at Lobbes includes a large number of excerpts from Augustine 
and Ambrose that contain information about Greek philosophers like Plato, Socrates, and 
Pythagoras—not their philosophy, but rather biographical anecdotes.40 The Tusculans apparently 
provided another source for this sort of information, about which the readers of the 10th and 11th 
centuries were profoundly curious. The interest of the Gembloux annotator and of those who 
quote the Tusculans show the work’s value as a treasure trove of anecdotes about the ancient 
world.  
 Much research still needs to be done both on the Tusculans in this period and on this 
method of studying reception. Some of the critical signs employed by the Gembloux scholars, for 
example, still require further explanation: is the y-sign consistently used to mark a single topic in 
a work? Is that topic always the soul?41 Nevertheless, I hope this thesis has shown the 
possibilities of a mode of inquiry into reception that takes into account a previously neglected 
type of material evidence about how a particular work was read in a particular medieval center at 
a particular time. 
 
  
                                                
40 Brussels MS 11080-81; 
 
41 Probably not. The usage of the y-mark in Grillius’ commentary on the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium in the same manuscript as the Tusculans (Brussels MS 5348-52) seems to be related 
to a small number of related subjects, but none of them is the soul.  
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